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Tuesday 31 January 2017

3 Certainties of Express Private Trusts

Express Private Trusts

3 Certainties (Knight v Knight)

i) Certainty of intention

e.g. intention to give a trust property on condition that he graduates with flying colours. The condition must be fulfilled.

1. Quah Eng Hock v Ang Hooi Kiam (2000) 5 CLJ 126
The court referred to the need for the words used to be clear and unequivocal and held that words indicating that the donor intended to divest himself or herself of the beneficial interest would be sufficient for the purpose.

2. Comiskey v Bowring-Hanbury (1905) AC 84
A legacy was left to a widow “in full confidence” that she would leave the property on her death to one or more of the testator’s nieces. The precatory (expressing a wish) words were in themselves ineffective to create a trust. This will, however, went on to declare  that “in default of any disposition by here thereof by her will, I hereby direct that all my estate and property acquired by her under my will shall at her death by equally divided among the surviving said nieces” 
Majority of the HL held that a trust had been created and on the death of the widow, the property would pass to the nieces as provided for in the will.

3. Re Adams and Kensington Vestry
The testator bequeathed property to his wife for the ‘absolute use of my wife’. Court held that there was no trust because the wordings made it more like an absolute gift.

ii) Subject matter = make it certain with details

Re Kolb’s Will Trust
A reference to stocks and shares ‘in the blue-chip category’ was insufficiently certain because the term ‘blue chip’, has no precise meaning. The trust failed for uncertainty of subject matter.

Re Golay’s Will Trust - where a direction to allow a beneficiary to "enjoy one of my flats during her lifetime and to receive a reasonable income from my other properties" was upheld as the trustees could select and decide the matters. This decision was criticized because ‘reasonable income’ may not be certain.

iii) Object = beneficiary

The object can be a person, or group, or animal, or a charitable association.

Sunday 29 January 2017

Land Law Malaysia - Indefeasibility of Title

Indefeasibility of Title

Immediate indefeasibility
Registration immediately establishes indefeasibility except in cases of fraud. A purchaser in good faith for value immediately gets a good title.

Deferred indefeasibility
Registration of title obtained without fraud remains potentially open to attack if certain circumstances exist until the title is transferred to another (bona fide third party).

Effect of registration – s.340(1) – the title is indefeasible subject to subsection 2
S.89 – Conclusiveness of RDT
S.92 – indefeasibility of final title
S.341 – no adverse possession against an indefeasible title

Ways title becomes defeasible
Fraud [s.340(2)(a)], Misrepresentation [s.340(2)(a)], Forgery (b), Void/insufficient instrument (b), unlawful acquisition (c), operation of law [s.340(4)], claim in personam [s.206(3)], operation of other statutes

General rule:

Frazer v Walker (PC)
Facts: Mr. Frazer and his wife were registered owners of a farm. Mrs. Frazer borrowed money from a third party using the farm as security without her husband’s consent. She forged her husband’s signature since both of their signatures were needed for the mortgage contract. The land was sold to Mr.Walker who was unaware of the forgery. Court held that Mr. Walker had an indefeasible title as he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Indefeasibility of title and interests … is a convenient description of the immunity from attack by adverse claim to the land or interest in respect of which … a registered proprietor enjoys.
Exceptions:

Kesarmal v Valiappa Chettiar – ‘...title of a proprietor is liable to be defeated’.

S.340(2) –(a), (b), (c)

Fraud : s.340(2)(a)

Not defined in the NLC

1. Assets Co v Mere Roihi
fraud … means actual fraud, that is, dishonesty of some sort … Further, it appears to their Lordships that the fraud which must be proved in order to invalidate the title of a registered proprietor for value … must be brought home to the person whose registered title is impeached or to his agents.

2. Waimiha Sawmilling Co v Waione Timber Co
Dishonesty – a wilful and conscious disregard and violation of the rights of other persons

Principle
Fraud must have been brought home to the person whose registered title or interest is being impeached, i.e. he or his agent must be a party or privy to the fraud: Doshi v Yeoh Tiong Lay where the question was whether the knowledge which the solicitor (agent) had of the illegality and fraud of the transaction could be imputed to the client (Principal).

3. Doshi v Yeoh Tiong Lay
The appellant was the registered owner of premises in KL. He obtained a loan from a lawyer and deposited his documents of title together with 2 blank transfer forms duly executed by him to the lawyer. Upon default of payment, the lawyer transferred the premises to a company which was subsequently transferred to YTL, the current registered proprietor. YTL charged the land back to the company. The lawyer was involved in both transactions. The argument is that the knowledge is imputed on the client to know about the fraud committed earlier.

Held: YTL can retain the title. The solicitor’s knowledge cannot be imputed on the client to know about the fraud. Need to prove actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge.

4. Tai Lee Finance Co Sdn Bhd v Official Assignee & Ors
Principle: the fraud complained of must have resulted in the registration of the title or interest and must have been committed before or at the time of registration

 - Whether it is a civil or criminal case, fraud has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is a question of fact, from case to case.


5. Owe Then Kooi v Au Thiam Seng [1990] 1 MLJ 234
There were 2 actions.
i) Suit brought by Owe Then Kooi against Au Thiam Seng, his half-brother and a bank
ii) Foreclosure action brought by the bank against Au Thiam Seng and 5 others, all of them were registered owners of a piece of land charged to the bank.
Owe Then Kooi contended that he was the registered owner of 1/7 undivided share of the land in dispute and argued that Au Thiam Seng had fraudulently transferred that 1/7 share to himself. Here, Owe Then Kooi was sent to prison for conviction of murder which was reduced to culpable homicide. When sent to prison, he asked Au Thiam Seng to hold the 1/7 share as trust for him until he finishes his sentence. In prison, Owe Then Kooi signed certain documents brought by a lawyer’s clerk thinking that it was to create a trust for him. He could only converse in Chinese, so he did not know the contents of the documents which were in English. When he was released from prison, Au Thiam Seng gave him the sum of 4,350 ringgit purportedly being his share of rentals paid in respect of the land and due to him. Owe didn’t suspect anything until he received a notice of real property gains tax levied on the disposal of his 1/7 share, which led to the civil suit.

Held:  Au Thiam Seng had effected the transfer of Owe Then Kooi’s share to himself fraudulently. The payment of rental arrears was only his attempt to delay the discovery of fraud by Owe. Furthermore, his subsequent charging of the property with the other co-owners and failure to attend court proceedings cemented the fact that he had in fact acted fraudulently.
The title to the property reverted to Owe Then Kooi, but the charge remained vested in the bank. The bank only acquired an interest as charge in the land and not a title to the land. The registered proprietor can still sell the land to a third party who will take it subject to the registered lease or charge.

6. OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Pendaftar Hakmilik, Negeri Johor Darul Takzim
In this case, the appellant bank was the chargee of a land granted by one Ng See Chow. Due to a default in payment, the appellant applied for the sale of the land. However, one Ng Kim Hwa claimed that he did not execute any transfer in favour of Ng See Chow and that the land was his. Court held that the appellant’s interest as chargee over the land was liable to be defeated under s.340(2)(b) and the proviso to s.340(3) didn’t apply although it was an innocent purchaser for value.
The principle established in OCBC case is that a chargee can only rely on the proviso in s.340(3) if the charge was granted after the land title was subsequently transferred, i.e. 2 transfers had taken place.

Mere knowledge of unregistered claim/interest amount to fraud?

(1) fraud against a previous holder of a registered title or interest

Datuk Jagindar Singh & Ors v Tara Rajaratnam
The respondent (Tara) was a registered proprietor of a land in Kulai, Johor. The 1st (Jagindar) and the 2nd (Suppiah) appellants were advocates and solicitors practicing in Johor. The 3rd appellant Arul was a partner in the Singapore firm of Rodyk and Davidson. 

Tara’s brother-in-law, Dr.Das had financial difficulties and needed to get a loan from HKBC in Singapore where Jagindar was the guarantor. Jagindar wanted Tara’s land as security for the loan. At the time, the land was charged as security to Chung Khiaw Bank. Later, Suppiah asked Tara to sign a document which purported to put the land as security. However, the form used the word ‘transfer’ and when Tara questioned about it; he said that the transaction was going to be a security. Suppiah inserted a manuscript to the agreement, where there were 2 undertakings:
i) the land was not to be sold to anyone for one year without the respondent’s consent.
ii) The land would be transferred back to the respondent upon the repayment of 220k within 1 year.

Contrary to the undertakings, Suppiah transferred the property 18 days later to the 3rd appellant, Arul. Then, on instruction from Jagindar, the land was transferred to Jet Age Construction Company, which was almost wholly owned by Jagindar. The property was then subdivided into 70 lots and sold to the public, so Tara couldn’t get the property back.

Held: The 1st and 2nd appellants never really intended to fulfill the conditions of the agreement and that they only wanted the respondent to sign the transfer form as they wanted the property. The 3rd appellant colluded with the other appellants to get possession of the property. Datuk Jagindar was the one who wanted the property, while Suppiah and Arul were merely acting for Jagindar, since Jagindar was the one who instructed them.

(2) fraud against the holder of an unregistered interest.

Loke Yew v Port Swettenham Rubber Co Ltd
In this case, Eusope was the registered owner of 322 acres of land, and the appellant (Loke Yew) was in possession of 58 acres of it under unregistered Malay documents, making him the owner subject to payment of rent. The respondents, who knew about the appellant’s interest bought from Eusope the 322 acres excepting the said 58 acres. However, a transfer for the whole of the 322 acres were prepared, and the respondents induced Eusope to sign it by saying that they would purchase the appellant’s interest and this was reduced into writing. After obtaining the entire 322 acres, the respondents ordered the appellant to give up possession of the 58 acres.

Held: The Privy Council found for Loke Yew and that the respondents acquired title through fraud. The respondents had more than mere knowledge of Loke Yew’s unregistered interest. The assurances it made to Eusope had been made to induce Eusope to execute the transfer of the land and amounted to a deliberate plan to deprive Loke Yew of his interest. 

Misrepresentation: s.340(2)(a)
Contracts Act 1950 – fraudulent, negligent, innocent
1. Loke Yew v Port Swettenham Rubber Co Ltd
2. Datuk Jagindar Singh & Ors v Tara Rajaratnam – fraudulent misrepresentation
                                                                     
Forgery: s.340(2)(b)

Where registration is obtained by forgery, the registered title or interest of that person or body who is a party to the forgery may be defeasible by reason of fraud under s.340(2)(a) or forgery under s.340(2)(b). It would appear to apply even where that person or body is a purchaser in good faith and for value.

Paragraph (b) is easier to prove and also on a lower burden of proof. It is much more difficult to prove fraud.

1. Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd (HC)
Facts: The issue was over the sale of two lots of land in Penang belonging to Boonsom Boonyanit. The defendant, Adorna, wanted to purchase those lots from her. The defendant’s solicitors obtained the vendor’s name from a land search, and her passport number from the solicitors. The vendor’s solicitors had also prepared a statutory declaration to correct the name of the title from Sun Yok Eng @ Boonsom Boonyanit to Mrs. Boonsoom Boonyanit. The transfer was registered in favour of the defendant. Later, the plaintiff, Mrs. Boonsom claimed that she was the true owner of the properties and had never sold them to the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the title acquired by the defendant was defeasible due to forgery.

Held: (i) The standard of proof in proving fraud is beyond reasonable doubt and not on a balance of probabilities.
(ii) Even if the plaintiff had proved forgery, the defendant had acquired an indefeasible title as a purchaser in good faith for value under the proviso to s.340(3).

2. Boonsom Boonyanit v Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd (COA)
(i) The standard of proof to be applied in civil forgery suits is on the balance of probabilities.
(ii) The words any purchaser in s.340 of the code refers to a subsequent purchaser, not an immediate purchaser. Therefore, deferred indefeasibility is practised and not immediate indefeasibility.

3. Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Boonsom Boonyanit @ Sun Yok Eng (FC)
(i) Agreed that the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities
(ii) Reversed the COA decision and held that by virtue of the proviso to s.340(3), any purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration obtains an immediate indefeasible title to the land. Even if there was forgery, the respondent still obtained an indefeasible title to the land.

4. Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San (FC) [2010]
The appellant was the registered owner of a land which was charged to UMBC, the 3rd respondent, to secure loans made in favour of the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent who acted under a power of attorney had executed the charges in favour of the 3rd respondent bank. The appellant claimed that he did not sign the power of attorney, that it was forged and that the charge was void.

Held: The charges registered in favour of the 3rd respondent were liable to be set aside under s.340(2)(b) on the ground of void instruments. Since the 3rd respondent was an immediate holder of the charges, it could not rely on the proviso to s.340(3).

Principle: This case has overruled the decision in Adorna Properties and held that deferred indefeasibility is practised, and not immediate indefeasibility.

Forgery v Fraud

The very fact of forgery suffices by itself in making a registered title defeasible irrespective of the absence of knowledge or implication on the part of the proprietor. ... it affects immediate proprietor even if he be an innocent purchaser for value: Chiew Lip Seng v Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd.

The forgery does not need to relate to the party whose title is to be defeated. An instrument which is forged is void: OCBC Bank (M) Bhd v Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Johor Darul Takzim

Burden of proof of forgery is on balance of probabilities: EON Bank Bhd v Hotel Flamingo and Another Case and not beyond reasonable doubt (HC in Boonsom Boonyanit case). FC and CA – on balance of probabilities.

How to prevent forgery?

Take all necessary precautions to ensure that the person who appeared before the lawyer is who he said he is.

Forgery and transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value

Boonsom Boonyanit – allowed the transfer to stand in the case of bona fide purchaser for value
cf
Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors
In this case, the registered proprietor had never paid for the land although the land was alienated by the State.

1. Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen  


2. Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen 

Wednesday 25 January 2017

How does Capacity, Intention and Revocation Affect Wills?

Capacity

1. Age – s.4 of Wills act – no will made by any person below the age of majority (18) is valid.
Issue: whether there should be a maximum age. One possible argument is to require persons of a certain age to acquire a doctor’s certificate. However, if done so, another issue is whether a will made without such certificate is valid?

2. Mental competence
- s.3 of Wills Act – every person of sound mind
- Banks v Goodfellow (Cockburn CJ) – testator must have a sound and disposing mind and memory.

i) Nature of business
Testator must be aware that he is engaged in a testamentary act, i.e. expressing his wishes regarding the disposition of property that takes effect upon death.

ii) Recollection of the property
Testator must have a general awareness of the property he wishes to dispose of and not every item.
Waters v Waters – testator doesn’t need to know every atom of his property, as long as he knows generally the state of his property and what it consists of. How much he ought to know depends on how much he has.

iii) Objects of his bounty
Testator must be aware of the existence of potential beneficiaries.
Harwood v Baker – testator executed a will few days prior to his death in which he left all of his property to the wife and excluded some relatives. Will was invalid. Testator was too ill to give sufficient consideration to the potential claims of his relatives. Question was whether the testator was capable of recollecting who were his potential beneficiaries and intelligently excluded them.

iv) Manner of distribution
Testator must be able to recollect the manner in which the property is to be distributed between the objects of his bounty.
Boughton v Knight – testator must have an understanding to comprehend his relationship with the objects of his bounty and their claim upon him.

- Two types of lack of mental capacity: (i) persons born with limited mental capacity, (ii) mental impairment

1.Wood v Smith
Testator was 82, made a will 2 days before death. Court held that there was insufficient evidence that the testator was able to comprehend the extent of his property or the nature of the claims of those he was excluding.
  
2. Brown v Pourau
Testatrix was occasionally subject to trances in which she talked to spirits and fairies because she believed that a Maori curse was placed on her. Will was still valid.

3. In the Estate of Park
Testator was 78 and had suffered 2 strokes. He was previously a successful businessman but became forgetful and confused. He married a cashier he hardly knew. They were married and the testator executed a new will. The will was invalid on grounds of lack of mental capacity.

Capriciousness
- Even if a will is eccentric, it can still be valid if it’s Banks v Goodfellow competent.

1. Boughton v Knight
The law doesn’t prevent a man from making a will that is moved by capricious, frivolous, mean or bad motives

2. Bird v Luckie
A man is not bound to make a will that deserves approbation from the prudent, wise or the good. Some wills may seem capricious but if the testator is brought back to life, he would be able to explain why the will was made that way.

3. William Shakespeare left his wife his ‘second best bed’.

4. Henry, the Earl of Stafford, described his wife as the worst of women and guilty of all crimes. He left her five and forty brass halfpence which will buy a pullet for her supper.

Delusions
- It is an irrational belief which cannot be eradicated by a rational argument. Only delusions that influence the testator in making his will may render the will invalid.
1. Dew v Clark
Testator gave his only child a small gift out of his large estate. He treated her with great cruelty in her youth and described her as a fiend, a monster, Satan’s special property and a very devil. However, evidence showed that she was of exemplary character. Will was invalid.

2. Boughton v Knight
Testator left bulk of his estate to strangers. Will was invalid due to the testator’s insane dislike for the son.

3. Waring v Waring
Testatrix suffered various delusions including one where the PM used to visit her house, disguised as a fish peddler, to have an improper connection with her.

4. Smee v Smee
Testator believed he was the son of King George the IV and that his father prevented him from benefiting a trust fund which was diverted to favour his brothers. The will totally excluded his brothers. Court held that the will was invalid.
5. Re Nightingale
Testator was dying from cancer. He cut out his adopted son who was the main beneficiary under his first will, from his second will. Court held that the testator probably thought that the son was trying to murder him because the son had gently pushed him back onto the bed when he tried getting up.

6. Banks v Goodfellow
Testator left most of the estate to his niece. She had cared for him and stayed with him. He was once in a lunatic asylum. He was still suffering from 2 delusions, i.e. he was being pursued by devils and evil spirits and that a dead man pursued and molested him. He was however capable of managing his affairs. Will was valid.

When must the testator have mental capacity?
- Must be mentally competent when the will is executed. Lack of competency before or after execution of will is not fatal.

1. In the Estate of Walker
Testator was declared a lunatic. She suffered delusions which made her violent. She however took interest in general topics, was a clever woman with excellent memory and etc. Her will made in the presence of 3 doctors certifying she was mentally competent was valid.

2. Chambers and Yatman v Queen’s Proctor
A barrister was alleged to have strange and eccentric habits. He suffered from delusions including that he was an object of scorn to his friends and the world. He made a will, committed suicide and the will was still valid.

3. Parker v Felgate
If a mentally competent testator gives instructions to a solicitor to make his will, then loses mental competence before the will is executed, the will may still be valid.

4. Battan Singh v Amirchand
Instructions given to lay intermediaries to be passed to solicitors were held to be invalid.

Burden of proof
1. Barry v Butlin
The burden of proof in proving mental capacity lies on the party propounding the will. If the will is rational on its face, the presumption is that the testator had mental capacity. The burden shifts to the party opposing the will to rebut such presumption by evidence to the contrary. If successfully rebutted, the burden shifts back to the propounder.

2. Symes v Green
Testator made a will which his nephew challenged. The will was rational and properly executed, so the testator was presumed to be mentally competent. Evidence however showed that he was suffering from insanity when he made the will. The burden shifted back to the propounder who failed to prove that the testator had mental competence.

- If the will is irrational on the face, the presumption is that the testator lacked mental capacity.

1. Austen v Graham
The testator left a small gift to his brother and the rest to the Turkish Ambassador to benefit the poor in Constantinople and to erect a cenotaph with the testator’s description. Court found it absurd since the testator was an English native and a Christian. However, evidence showed that the testator had in his early life adopted the mode of living of a Mohamedan. Will was valid.

- There is a presumption that if the testator has been mentally competent prior to the will, he is also mentally competent during the execution.
- If the testator is known to be insane before execution, presumption is that the testator was still insane at the execution.

1. Cartwright v Cartwright
Testator’s will was rational on its face. Presumption was that she was mentally competent but evidence showed that she was insane 6 months before the will’s execution. The will was still upheld because of evidence that the testatrix understood the state of her affairs and to give what was proper in the way she has done.

Effect of mental incompetence
The will fails if the testator lacks mental incompetence. However, if the incapacity only affected 1 part of the will, the rest may still be valid.

1. Re Bohrmann
Testator was a psychopath. He however had exceptional acumen in managing his private affairs. He made substantial gifts to English Charities. However, he added a codicil to revoke gifts made to English Charities in favour of American Charities because he suffered a delusion that he was being persecuted by the London County Council. The judge upheld the will with the omission of the revoking clause.

- It is always recommended to arrange for the testator to be examined by a medical practitioner.
1. Kenward v Adams
If the testator is old and infirm, the making of his will should be witnessed and approved by a medical practitioner.

- There is no presumption that a person who is addicted to alcohol lacks testamentary capacity unless evidence can show that the testator was severely drunk when he made the will.

1. In the Estate of Heinke
Testator revoked a substantial gift to his housekeeper of 16 years, during a bout of heavy drinking. Codicil was held invalid on the ground that the deceased had not been of sound mind, memory and understanding.

2. Chana v Chana
A will was upheld even though the testator was a heavy drinker. A will becomes invalid if it can be shown that the drunkenness prevented the testator from knowing the nature of his act.
Intention
- A testator must have animus testandi when he executes a will. If no intention, the will is invalid. The testator must know and approve of the contents of the will.

1. d’Eye v Avery
Testator suffered a stroke and was unable to communicate. He made a will with the help of a former dancing partner. Although he had capacity to make a will, he lacked knowledge and approval. Will was invalid.

- If a will is properly executed and if the testator had mental capacity, the presumption is that there is animus testandi.

1. Lister v Smith
If a paper appears to be the record of a testamentary act, but in reality it was the offspring of joke, not seriously intended as a disposition of property, it should not be a valid will.

2. Nichols v Nichols
Testator’s will was written ‘I leave all my property between my children…that they will worship God, and not black coats.’ Black coats referred to lawyers whom the deceased was one and whom he loved to ridicule. The document was executed where the deceased wanted to show how short a will could be. The deceased never again referred to the will and regarded himself as not having made a will. Court pronounced intestacy.

Wishes intended to take effect on death
- testator must make an expression of wishes, normally to dispose of his property upon his death.

1. Hodson v Barnes
The words ’17-1925. Mag, Everything I possess. – J.B.’ was held to not constitute a will.

2. In the Estate of Knibbs
A barman on a liner said to the head barman during a chat about his sister Iris that ‘If anything ever happens to me, Iris will get anything I have got’. Court held that those words were mere gossip spoken without animus testandi.

3. Re Stable
Deceased was a young soldier. His solicitor mistakenly told him he could not make a will. He told his fiancée that he would give everything to her if anything happened to him. Court held that the will was valid as the statement was made with animus testandi.

Conditional Wills
- Testator may make wills which are conditional on the occurrence of some specified event. If condition is not fulfilled, there is no animus testandi.
                                             
 1. In the Goods of Hugo,
A married couple executed a joint will before a journey which had a condition that it is effective if they died together by the same accident. They survived the journey. The joint will was invalid.

2. In the Goods of Spratt
Testator was a soldier serving in New Zealand. He wrote to his sister saying that if the war continued and if he dies in an accident, his money goes to his sister. The testator died years after the war ended. Will was valid because it was not conditional. A will is unconditional if the testator says that he is led to making the will due to the uncertainty of life.

Knowledge and Approval
- The testator must know and approve of the contents of the will.

1. Cleare v Cleare
The testator must know and approve of the contents of the will. Lack of knowledge and approval renders a will invalid.
- The burden of proof is on the propounder of the will. If the will is duly executed and made by a testator with the mental capacity, the presumption would be that there was knowledge and approval. The burden then shifts to the person challenging the will to rebut the presumption. If evidence exists to rebut the presumption, the burden goes back to the propounder.

Suspicious circumstances
1. Tyrrell v Painton
If there are circumstances which excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder of the will has the burden to prove affirmatively that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will. If successfully proven, the burden shifts to the party challenging the will to prove fraud, undue influence or mistake.

Wills prepared by beneficiary
1. Barry v Butlin
When a party prepares a will under which he benefits from it, it becomes a circumstance that excites the suspicion of the court. The Court will not uphold the will unless the suspicion is removed.
In this case, the testator gave nothing to his son. He gave a large amount to his Attorney. However, the suspicions were removed because, amongst others, the testator had been very friendly with the attorney and the will was executed openly in the presence of respectable witnesses.

2. Wintle v Nye
The solicitor made a will for the testatrix, Nye, which disposed of a substantial amount of property for the solicitor. The solicitor didn’t advise Nye to seek independent advice and the will was beyond the understanding of the testatrix. Court held that there was a heavy burden on the solicitor to prove knowledge and approval on behalf of Nye. Will was invalid.



3. Re Dabbs
Testator executed a will which was prepared for him on a computer by the claimant who was a major beneficiary under the will. The principle is that the greater the degree of suspicion, the greater will be the burden of dispelling that suspicion.

4. In Re A Solicitor
A solicitor was struck off the Roll for failing to advise 2 sisters-in-law to seek independent advice when they sought to make wills for the solicitor and his family.

Wills prepared by close relatives of a beneficiary
1. Tyrrell v Painton
Testatrix had made wills in favour of the defendant. However, she later made another will benefiting her cousin instead. The defendant’s son later visited her accompanied by his friend, a strange man. The testatrix made a new will though she was exhausted in favour of the defendant. It was written in the son’s handwriting and witnessed by the son and his friend. The will was invalid.
Principle: Even wills prepared by close relatives of a beneficiary can excite the suspicion of the court. Any well-grounded suspicion will suffice.

Mistake
- Not every mistake will affect knowledge and approval

i) Mistake as to whole will
1. Re Meyer
2 sisters attempted to make a codicil in favour of the other but mistakenly executed the other’s codicil. When the first of them died, it was held that the codicil is not valid as she had not intended to sign it. There was no animus testandi.

ii) Mistake as to legal effect
- A mistake as to the legal effect of the testator’s provision doesn’t affect the validity of the will.

1. Collins v Elstone
Testatrix left 2 wills and a codicil to the 1st will. The 2nd will contain a clause revoking all previous dispositions. She did not wish to revoke any earlier testamentary dispositions but the executor said that it wouldn’t. The advice was given mistakenly. Court held that since she knew of the clause, it revoked the earlier will.

iii) Mistake as to contents
-If any part was included by mistake without testator’s knowledge and approval, it can be omitted provided it doesn’t change the sense of the will.

1. In the Goods of Oswald
Testatrix executed a later will not realizing it contained a revocation clause. Court held that the revocation clause can be excluded.

 2. In the Goods of Boehm
Testator intended a bequest to be given to his daughters, Georgiana and Florence. The counsel who drafted the will mistakenly inserted Georgiana in both bequests. Court held that the name Georgiana could be omitted from the bequests intended for Florence.

3. Morrell v Morrell
Testator instructed that all his 400 shares in his company should pass to his nephews. Counsel drafted the gift as comprising forty shares. Courts held that the word could be omitted since the testator didn’t approve the inclusion of the word forty. All shares were passed to the nephew.

Fraud
- Testator is intentionally misled or deceived thus affecting the making of his will.

1. Allen v M’Pherson
The testator, having made large bequests to the appellant in his will, executed a final codicil containing a much smaller gift. It was alleged that this was the result of false representations made about the appellant’s character to the testator who was feeble in mind and boy. It was held that this is fraud.

2. Wilkinson v Joughin
Testator married a married woman. She deliberately concealed the fact from him. Testator described her as his wife in the will. The gift was void due to fraud. However, a gift to her daughter was valid since she was innocent.

3. Re Posner
Facts were similar but the testator was not deliberately misled since neither he nor his wife knew at the time of marriage that the wife was still married. Gift was upheld as there was no fraud.

Undue influence
- Coercion. Whether the influence asserted is coercion or persuasion?

1. Hall v Hall
In this case, the will failed because it was made for the sake of peace in consequence of the violence from the sole beneficiary, his wife.
Principle: If pressure of whatever character is exerted to overpower the volition of the testator in the making of his will, then it is considered as coercion.

2. Parfitt v Lawless
In this case, the priest served as the testatrix’s confessor. He received bulk of the testatrix’s estate under the will. There was no coercion.
Principle: i) No presumption of undue influence arises from the proof of a relationship
                ii) To prove undue influence, it is necessary to prove coercion, i.e. the testator’s                       volition was overborne.

  
a) No presumption
1. Craig v Lamoureux
Husband was the sole beneficiary under the ill wife’s will. He was instrumental in having her prepare a will. However, there was no evidence of coercion.

2. Mynn v Robinson
Wife made a new will departing from a previous will 9 days before her death in an extremely weak state. Presumption of undue influence arose and wasn’t rebutted. The husband had a record of deceptive behaviour. The presumption arose because of the circumstances surrounding the will’s execution.

b) Coercion
1. Wingrove v Wingrove
It is not sufficient to show that a person has the power to coerce the testator. It has to be shown that the power was indeed exercised. Coercion may be present even without actual violence. For instance, if a testator is so old that he is dependent and the caretaker threatens to leave him.

2. Betts v Doughty
Testatrix was 80 years old and attempted to alter her will to exclude the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs told her that if she executed a new will, she could not reside in their house. A solicitor’s clerk brought the new will for execution but was not allowed to see her. Courts upheld the earlier will but imposed a trust on the plaintiffs to hold their shares as trustees for the beneficiaries under the intended will.

3. Re Harden
Testatrix was dominated by a man who allegedly had occult powers as a medium. He passed messages from the other side as to how the testatrix should dispose of her estate. Wills were invalid due to undue influence.

Hampson v Guy – the weaker the testator, the easier to prove undue influence

Boyse v Rossborough – strong evidence of fraud or undue influence must be adduced since the allegations impart an element of moral condemnation.


Re Cutcliffe’s Estate – the party who made the pleas of undue influence would be penalized for costs if their pleas were unsuccessful. 

Tuesday 24 January 2017

What are Pleadings under Civil Procedure Law in Malaysia

Pleadings

Definition: written statements of facts exchanged between parties in a civil proceeding

O 18 + O 19 of the ROC: service of pleadings, set-off, counterclaim (O 15), default of service and close of pleadings

General rule: Parties are bound by their pleadings

The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [Federal Court]
In this case, the respondent had issued a cheque which was dishonoured. He brought a claim against the bank for libel. In the pleadings, his claim was based on libel. The trial judge held that the action based on libel was barred by the limitation period. However, the judge gave damages of $1,000 for breach of contract.

On appeal to the Federal Court, it was held that the learned judge was clearly wrong when he concluded that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract. Since he had decided on an issue not raised on the pleadings, the judgment was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

Exceptions:

1. Illegality

i) Wai Hin Tin Mining Co Ltd v Lee Chow Beng
The plaintiffs claimed repayment of an interest free loan of $2,500 lent by the plaintiffs to the defendant for the defendant to purchase shares in the plaintiff company. The defendant did not object to the legality of the loan. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ claim was based on an illegality as the loan transaction contravened the companies’ articles of association and the Companies Ordinance of 1940. Therefore, the claim was dismissed.

ii) North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd
House of Lords laid down 4 situations where the Court will not enforce a claim based on illegality even if it was not pleaded:
a         1) Ex facie illegal (it is obvious on the face of it
      2) Evidence of extraneous circumstances tending to show that it was an illegal object
3) Unpleaded facts which taken by themselves show an illegal object
4) Where the Court have all the relevant facts and it can be seen clearly that the contract had an illegal object

2. Lack of jurisdiction

Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Manchester Ship Canal Co
In this case, certain statutes provided that certain disputes are to be heard by way of arbitration. An action was brought by the plaintiff to the Court in contravention with the statutes. Although the issue of jurisdiction was not raised in the pleadings, the Court will allow an objection of lack of jurisdiction to be raised during the trial. The claim was dismissed.

3. Point not pleaded but presented and developed without objection

i) Kaliammal v Manickam
The principle is that if a defendant wishes to rely on a statute of limitation, it must be pleaded. If an action to recover a debt is statute-barred, the plaintiff will not be able to claim for recovery of the debt provided the defendant has pleaded the limitation period. However, the six years period is subject to s. 26(2) of the Limitation Act which provides for a fresh accrual of action if the defendant acknowledges the claim. The limitation period will then set in later.

ii) KEP Mohamed Ali v KEP Mohamed Ismail [Federal Court] – the acknowledgment to the debt under s.26 of the Limitation Act applies even if not pleaded.

4. Wisma Punca Emas exception

Wisma Punca Emas Sdn Bhd v Dr Donal R O’Holohan [Supreme Court]
In this case, the appellant contended that the main issue was a question of negligence but the trial judge awarded the claim of nuisance, i.e. physical damage to adjoining land and awarded both damages accordingly.


The respondent contended that nuisance was not pleaded in the statement of claim. Furthermore, there was a great difference between negligence and nuisance. The Court held that the difference between negligence and nuisance is not important as the facts also showed nuisance. It should be noted however that the decision sets a dangerous precedent as a plaintiff may get away with statement of claims that are vague and lacks clarity and precision.

Monday 23 January 2017

Charge under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)

Definition: Charge is not defined in the CPC

Basically, it is a specific accusation made against a person of an offence alleged to have been committed by him.

General principles of charges:

1. Jagar Singh v PP [ACRJ Perak]
The appellant was convicted on a charge which stated that he drove his car carelessly without reasonable regard to the safety, comfort or convenience of other road users. There were two offences in 1 charge and the conviction was bad for duplicity.
Principle: an accused person must know exactly what is the charge he is called upon to answer and he should know of what offence he has been convicted.

2. PP v Leong Yoon Meow [High Court]
Principle: In drafting a charge, if what an accused person is alleged to have done cannot be described in the language of any statutory provision creating an offence, then the probability is that no offence has been committed.

3. Datuk Haji Wasli bin Mohd Said v PP [High Court]
Principle: Art. 145(3) of the FC allows the PP to prefer whatever charges and at whatever time he chooses. The Court has no inherent power to override that provision.

Form of Charges

SS. 152 – 154

1. PP v Chung Tshun Tin [High Court]
The accused should be informed with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of the charge brought against him, otherwise he may be prejudiced in his defence.

2. PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim [Federal Court]
- It is mandatory to follow s. 153 of the CPC where the time stated in the charge must be particular as it is a ‘material matter’.

3. Law Kiat Lang v PP [Federal Court] - the date in the charge has never been material – the Court didn’t refer to s.153(1)

4. Pang Neng Tiong v PP [High Court]
In this case, the charge was for attempted robbery under s.397 of the PC read with s. 511. However, s. 511 doesn’t provide for the relevant punishment. Court held that s. 393 of the PC which provides for the offence under s.397 should be stated in the charge instead of s. 511. The Court allowed the charge to be amended.

S. 421 – omission to frame charge doesn’t nullify a conviction or sentence unless a failure of justice was caused.

Errors on Charges

S. 156 – no error in stating or omitting to the state the offence or the particulars therein shall be regarded as material unless the accused was misled by the error or omission.

S. 422 – general provision to cure any error, omission or irregularity unless it occasions a failure of justice.

Low Seng Wah v PP [High Court] – burden is on the accused to establish that he was misled by the error or omission

Gunalan a/l Visuanathan v PP [High Court]
The appellant was charged under s.392/397 of the PC for robbery. However, on the facts the appellant did not use any weapon and therefore the charge should be under s.329 of the PC. However, the defective charge did not cause a failure of justice as he knew what type of offence he was charged with. It was curable under s. 422.

Periasamy & Anor v PP [High Court]
The accused was charged under s. 148 of the PC with the offence of rioting and being in possession of weapons. However, the charge stated that the accused had rioted using deadly weapons which might cause death. Held: charge was defective as it was inconsistent with s. 148. The error was material and not curable under s. 422 as it would prejudice the accused.

Amendment of Charges

SS. 158 -162

1. PP v Salamah bte Abdullah
The appropriate time to amend the charge is at the end of the prosecution’s case even though s. 158 provides that amendment may be made before judgment.

2. PP v James Tan [High Court]
Where the facts disclose another offence for which the accused is not charged, the court ought to amend the charge unless there are reasons for not doing so.

3. Hee Nyuk Fook v PP [Supreme Court]

Where in the course of trial a charge is amended, it is mandatory to read and explain the amended charge to an accused person pursuant to s. 158(ii) of the PC. Whether s. 158 is mandatory depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Friday 20 January 2017

Authorities For Adverse Possession In Land Law Malaysia

Adverse possession

- Other powers of state land. 
Adverse possession against state land – s.48
Against private land – s.341
Adverse possession – the longer a person stays on the land, the more it becomes his or her land.
S.425 – unlawful occupation

1. Sidek bin Haji Muhammad & Ors v Govt of the State of Perak & Ors
- the title to State land can only be acquired by alienation and not otherwise. Such alienation must be effected in accordance with the provisions in the statute.

2. Government of Negeri Sembilan v Yap Chong Lan
- strengthens the point of s.48. Squatters do not own land. Order 89 of the Rules of Court 2012 – evict squatter. Summary possession.

3. Sidek bin Haji Muhammad & Ors v Govt of the State of Perak & Ors
The appellants went to Perak to open up a large part of the jungle area. They met with the government officers and there was a promise by the officers that each family will receive 5 areas of paddy land. Some squatters were given 3 acres and others including the appellant didn’t get any. Appellants were asked to vacate the land.

Held: Appellant had no cause of action against the respondents. Squatters have no right at all in law and in equity. S.48 was quoted. S.78 – land not alienated then too bad. S.425 – offence for unlawful occupation. Equity couldn’t apply.

4. Bohari bin Taib & Ors v PTG Selangor – procedures on the eviction of squatters is order 89 of the ROC 2012.

5. Tetuan Tokoyaki Property Sdn Bhd v Sam Kok Sang
- Even if you were given certain facilities, it doesn’t indicate that they recognize your ownership.
i) Mere applying to the State Authority for land doesn’t grant a licence from the State Authority to live or continue to live on the land.
ii) An illegal squatter has no protection in law or in equity to enable him to claim a right to live or continue to live on the lot. Merely erecting a building on the lot and occupying it doesn’t create any right or equity against the rightful land owner.
iii) Mere payment of assessment for the first defendant’s house doesn’t impliedly give him the permission or consent to continue to live on the lot as the charge is imposed by the local authority because ss. 127 and 163(1) of the Local Government Act 1976 empowers the local authority to impose charges.
iv) By providing water, electricity and litter bins, it doesn’t mean that the State Authority had impliedly given the first defendant permission to live or continue to live on the said lot.
Note: Compensation may be given by the government to squatters although it is not compulsory legally.

6. Government of the State of Negeri Sembilan v Yap Chong Lan & Ors
Issue: whether the respondents have acquired equitable interest/right to remain on the lots?

1. The collector has no authority to bind the State Authority.
2. No equitable estoppel in public law. Cannot use against the Public Authority in exercising its powers.
There was a promise by the collector to allow the respondents to stay on the land. The promise was for a 99 years lease. Held: Collector has no right to bind the SA.
S. 78(3)

7. UMBC v Pemungut Hasil Tanah Kota Tinggi
Privy Council – no intervention by equity. NLC is complete and comprehensive. Cannot apply equity to NLC.
- If want to apply equity, only apply it in private ownership. No reason to extend it to public law of planning and control where it binds everyone.

8. Chong Wooi Leong & Ors v Lebbey Sdn Bhd
Politician promised to give TOL to certain people during election. Promise is not binding

9. Muniandy a/l Subramaniam & Ors v Majlis Perbandaran Langkawi Bandaraya Pelancongan & Anor
- About a temple that existed since 1928, i.e. before state government acquired the land. The status of the land was reverted back to State land. Temple had to be demolished.